People v. Batticks
2020 NY Slip Op 05840
Decided on October 20, 2020
Criminal Appeals Lawyer 1-800-APPEALS (1-800-277-3257)
Issue:
Juror Outburst Raises Questions of Juror Bias
Whether the trial court erred in failing to conduct a Buford inquiry as to the fitness of a juror after she stood mid-trial to exclaim that she was offended and threatened to leave if counsel did not stop repeating a pejorative racial epithet as part of the questioning of a witness.
Holding:
No Juror Bias Demonstrated
The Court held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in foregoing a Buford inquiry into juror bias and instead offering curative instructions, as the outburst was “understandable” after counsel’s “fifth and gratuitous” use of the epithet.
Facts:
Defendant Jonathan Batticks was tried jointly with two codefendants, Wiggins and Bailey, for their assault of fellow prisoner Steven Davis while the four men were incarcerated. During cross-examination, Bailey’s counsel “attempt[ed] to goad” Davis by using various verbal taunts verbatim, including asking Davis five times whether Wiggins had called him an “old [n-word]” After the fifth time, a juror stood up and said, “Please, I am not going to sit here…and have you say that again. Don’t say it again or I am leaving…I find that very offensive.” The court reprimanded the juror and admonished counsel for repeating the question “a half dozen times.” Bailey’s counsel moved for a mistrial, claiming the juror was grossly unqualified because she was unable to separate the facts from her own “distaste” for the racial slur, while Batticks’ counsel moved to strike the juror on the same grounds. The trial court found that the juror was not unqualified, that her reaction was directed solely at “the number of times” the slur was used and opted instead to issue curative instruction about fairness and impartiality.
Analysis:
Buford Inquiry and Juror Impartiality
In People v Buford, 69 NY2d 290 (1987), the Court set forth a framework to determine whether a juror must be discharged as grossly unqualified or where the juror has engaged in misconduct of a substantial nature. Given the gravity of a juror’s oath, the court’s removal “places a greater burden upon the moving party” and “is satisfied only when it becomes obvious that a particular juror possesses a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict” (Buford, 69 NY2d at 298). Additionally, the Court has long recognized that “the law prescribes the qualifications of jurors,” and that the court cannot, “in its discretion, or capriciously, set aside jurors as incompetent, whom the law declares are competent” (Hildreth v City of Troy, 101 NY 234, 239 [1886]).
CPL 270.35 (1) states, “If at any time after the trial jury has been sworn and before the rendition of its verdict, a juror is unable to continue serving by reason of illness or other incapacity, or for any other reason is unavailable for continued service, or the court finds, from facts unknown at the time of the selection of the jury, that a juror is grossly unqualified to serve in the case or has engaged in misconduct of a substantial nature, but not warranting the declaration of a mistrial, the court must discharge such juror…”
The Court holds that a sworn juror is not grossly unqualified and subject to removal “merely because the juror is irritated with one of the attorneys or disagrees with the way the evidence is presented” (Buford, 69 NY2d at 299). Further, “a juror’s declaration about being emotional about the case” is not equivalent to a “declaration of actual bias” or state of mind preventing the juror from deciding the case solely on the evidence, “as a declaration regarding emotions alone does not render a juror grossly unqualified” (People v Spencer, 29 NY3d 302, 311 [2017]).
In United States v Panebianco (543 F2d 447, 457 [2nd Circuit 1976]) the Second Circuit held that a voir dire was not required after two jurors expressed “annoyance” with counsel’s questions that had been “a little facetious and repetitious at times.” In that case, the court explained, “That jurors react naturally does not mean they are biased.”
Likewise, the juror’s reaction in this case did not render her grossly unqualified, but was instead an “understandable,” natural reaction to counsel’s repeated use “over and over again” of an offensive racial slur.
Deference to Trial Court’s Discretion
The Court holds that a trial judge “having the ability to continually observe the jury in court, is in the best position” to asses juror demeanor and bias and “to devise an appropriate remedy” (People v Kudzal, 31 NY3d 478, [2018]). This unique vantage point demands that courts be afforded wide latitude in investigating juror bias and making the “delicate determination” as to whether a juror as become grossly unqualified (Kudzal at 485).Under this flexible approach, not every allegation of juror misconduct warrants an intrusive Buford inquiry, and the Court has approved alternate procedures and ameliorative instructions when juror bias or partiality is not in doubt. Indeed, the Court holds that a Buford inquiry may not always be the best course of action, and the court may fashion an alternative remedy that protects defendants’ rights to an impartial jury while “ensuring that the jury proceedings [are] not ‘jeopardized by unauthorized invasions” (Kudzal, 31 NY3d at 486).
The Court therefore found that the trial court’s measured response to offer curative instructions regarding juror impartiality was not an abuse of discretion, but was instead a “thorough and sensible approach” that saw the outburst for what it was—“not an act of substantial misconduct,” but an “understandable exasperation with counsel’s tactics.” There was no indication that the jurors’ ability to main her sworn oath to render an impartial verdict was hampered, thus no Buford inquiry was needed. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was affirmed.