People v Reyes
NY Slip Op 01113
Decided on February 15, 2018
Issue:
Conspiracy Conviction for Attending Gang Meetings?
Whether the evidence submitted at trial was legally sufficient to convict defendant Reyes of conspiracy in the second degree where, as a gang member, he attended meetings in which a crime was discussed and planned, but he did not participate in the crime itself.
Holding:
Knowledge of Conspiracy Does Not Make One a Coconspirator
The Court of Appeals held that defendant’s presence at the gang meetings alone is insufficient to convict Reyes of conspiracy in the second degree, as “knowledge of the existence and goals of a conspiracy does not of itself make one a coconspirator” (United States v Ceballos, 340 F3d 115, 123 [2d Cir 2003]).
Facts:
Defendant, a member of the Almighty Latin King Nation, was charged with conspiracy in the second degree when fellow gang members firebombed the house of a rival and former Latin King member. Reyes did not participate in the attack, but he attended gang meetings where the crime was planned and discussed by other members. At trial, the People offered evidence of defendant’s membership in the gang and his presence at the meetings, and two gang members testified as to cooperation agreements. Defendant was found guilty of conspiracy; the Appellate Division held that the jury verdict was legally insufficient.
Analysis:
‘Legally Sufficient’ Verdict
A verdict is legally sufficient when, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the People, there “is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]). When reviewing for sufficiency, a court must “marshal competent facts most favorable to the People and determine whether, as a matter of law, a jury could logically conclude that the People sustained its burden of proof.” (id.)
‘Agreement’ is the Core Element of Conspiracy
In New York person is guilty of conspiracy in the second degree when, “with intent that conduct constituting a class A felony be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct” (Penal Law § 105.15). The key element of the conspiracy is that of agreement, which will be found where there is a “concrete and unambiguous…expression of each actor’s intent to violate the law” (People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 149 [2005]).
The People provided evidence of 1) the gang’s structure and the roles and responsibilities of gang members, 2) defendant’s membership in the gang, 3) defendant’s participation in a previous attack on the victim, and 4) defendant’s attendance at several meetings during which the arson attack was discussed and planned. But the Court of Appeals held that the law does not contain a presumption of agreement based on sheer presence at a meeting in which a conspiracy is discussed, and the Court does not equate “being present” at such meetings with the affirmative act of “agreeing” to engage in the criminal conspiracy. The People’s evidence, therefore, was legally insufficient to support a jury conviction of conspiracy, and the order of the Appellate Division was affirmed.