People v. Regan
2023 NY Slip Op 01353
Decided March 16, 2023
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Issue:
Whether the pre-indictment delay of more than 4 years in prosecution of a serious crime violated the Due Process right of the defendant to a prompt prosecution.
Holding:
The New York State Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of Andrew J. Regan for rape and burglary on the grounds that the state had violated his Due Process right to a prompt prosecution, embodied in the due process clause of the state constitution. Regan was accused of raping a woman he knew well in August 2009, and the prosecution did not file an indictment until over four years later. Despite Regan’s initial refusal to provide a DNA sample, which was later refuted, the prosecution took over three years to request a warrant for his DNA, which was eventually used as evidence to convict him.
The court noted that the delay in the case was substantial and unjustified, and that it was the prosecution’s burden to prove that there was no violation of the defendant’s due process rights. The court found that the prosecution had not met this burden, as it had not provided any explanation for the majority of the delay, which lasted from June 2011 to June 2012. The court also noted that the prosecution had not taken any steps to obtain a warrant until after the defendant’s attorney had pointed out the possibility of a constitutional violation.
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Analysis:
By statute and constitutional law, New York guarantees criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial and prompt prosecution (see People v Staley, 41 NY2d 789, 791; People v Vernace, 96 NY2d 886, 887 [2001]; NY Const Art I, § 6; CPL § 30.20). “[T]he State due process requirement of a prompt prosecution is broader than . . . the Sixth Amendment . . . . [and] [i]n some respects the State rule is less rigid in its application than the right to due process recognized under the Federal Constitution” (Singer, 44 NY2d 241, 253). This Court has “long held that unreasonable delay in prosecuting a defendant constitutes a denial of due process of law,” and that “[a]n untimely prosecution may be subject to dismissal even though, in the interim, defendant was not formally accused, restrained or incarcerated for the offense” (see Singer, 44 NY2d at 253 [internal quotation marks omitted]). “[T]he Court of Appeals has never drawn a fine distinction between due process violations based on delay in commencing prosecution and speedy trial violations,” and “the factors utilized to determine if a defendant’s rights have been abridged are the same whether the right asserted is a speedy trial right or the due process right to prompt prosecution” (People v Wiggins, 31 NY3d 1, 12 [2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Those factors are:
“(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay”(Wiggins, 31 NY3d at 9-10, quoting People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445 [1975]). ” ‘[N]o one factor or combination of the factors . . . is necessarily decisive or determinative of the [prompt prosecution] claim, but rather the particular case must be considered in light of all the factors as they apply to it’ ” (Wiggins, 31 NY3d at 10, quoting Taranovich, 37 NY2d at 445).
Analysis Under The Taranovich Factors:
Applying the Taranovich factors to this case, the delay was considerable. Although “there is no specific length of time that automatically results in a due process violation,” longer delays are more likely to inflict greater harms (People v Johnson, 39 NY3d 92, 97 [2022], citing Taranovich, 37 NY2d at 445-446; see also People v Cousart, 58 NY2d 62, 68 [1982] [citing Singer for the proposition that “a five-year delay prior to trial raises a presumption of prejudice”]).
In People v Staley, the Court of Appeals held that a “wholly unexplained 31-month delay” was an “extraordinary time-lapse” that “would, without question, be cause for dismissal of the indictment” even without any showing of prejudice (see 41 NY2d at 790-793). Even the People concede that the delay here was “excessive.” The fact that the Legislature removed the statute of limitations does not change our analysis (see Singas, J., dissenting op at 19 n 7) and if anything heightens the need for constitutional vigilance (see Singer, 44 NY2d at 253 [“it cannot be assumed that the Statute of Limitations will adequately protect the defendant against the potential prejudice inherent in any delay, since in this State there is no Statute of Limitations for (rape in the first degree)”]). Under the most charitable interpretation of the record and our case law, the People cannot satisfactorily account for 31 months of their four-year delay.
The third factor refers to both the seriousness and the complexity of the crime (see 39 NY3d, at 97). Defendant was accused and ultimately convicted of a heinous crime. However, the preparation to which the People attribute a delay for the prosecution of this particular crime was not complex. The People had the complainant’s sworn statement and witness interviews immediately; the only missing evidence was the DNA evidence from defendant, which could have been obtained with speed and ease.
As to the fourth factor, defendant was not incarcerated pretrial (cf. Romeo, 12 NY3d at 58 [concluding the fourth factor was “not significant in this case” involving postindictment delay because “(a)t no point during his prosecution on the Suffolk County charges has he faced additional incarceration from those charges”]).
As to the fifth factor, prejudice caused by the delay, defendant did not show special prejudice, but is not required to do so under our case law. We have repeatedly held that if the first two factors favor defendant, establishment of prejudice is not required to find a due process violation (see e.g., Singer, 44 NY2d at 254 [“if commencement of the action has been delayed for a lengthy period, without good cause, the defendant may be entitled to dismissal although there may be no showing of special prejudice”]; Wiggins, 31 NY3d at 13; Taranovich, 37 NY2d at 446-447 [the “traditional view in the Court of Appeals (is) that where in the circumstances delay is great enough there need be neither proof nor fact of prejudice to the defendant”
PRE-INDICTMENT DELAY VERSUS POST-INDICTMENT DELAY TREATED DIFFERENTLY
Although the Court treats alleged due process violations based on preindictment delay and alleged speedy trial violations based on postindictment delay similarly, there are some relevant distinctions. We have repeatedly stated, in the context of preindictment delay, that “a [*4]determination made in good faith to defer commencement of the prosecution for further investigation or for other sufficient reasons, will not deprive the defendant of due process of law even though the delay may cause some prejudice to the defense” (Singer, 44 NY2d at 254; see People v Decker, 13 NY3d 12, 14 [2009]; Vernace, 96 NY2d at 888). “By contrast, in post-charge delay cases, the People’s good faith determination to delay the defendant’s trial cannot continue indefinitely, even if their proffered justification for the delay would otherwise excuse a reasonable period of delay” (Wiggins, 31 NY3d at 13). In other words, “[t]he People necessarily have wider discretion to delay commencement of prosecution for good faith, legitimate reasons than they do to delay a defendant’s trial after charges have been filed, even for legitimate reasons and without acting in bad faith”
The New York State Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of Andrew J. Regan for rape and burglary on the grounds that the state had violated his right to a prompt prosecution, embodied in the due process clause of the state constitution. Regan was accused of raping a woman he knew well in August 2009, and the prosecution did not file an indictment until over four years later. Despite Regan’s initial refusal to provide a DNA sample, which was later refuted, the prosecution took over three years to request a warrant for his DNA, which was eventually used as evidence to convict him.
The court noted that the delay in the case was substantial and unjustified, and that it was the prosecution’s burden to prove that there was no violation of the defendant’s due process rights. The court found that the prosecution had not met this burden, as it had not provided any explanation for the majority of the delay, which lasted from June 2011 to June 2012. The court also noted that the prosecution had not taken any steps to obtain a warrant until after the defendant’s attorney had pointed out the possibility of a constitutional violation.
The court acknowledged that the case was complicated, but stressed that this did not excuse the prosecution’s failure to move the case forward more promptly. The court noted that the complainant’s testimony was crucial to the case, and that the delay could have affected her credibility. The court also noted that the delay had prejudiced the defendant’s ability to defend himself, as he had lost touch with potential witnesses and his memory of the events may have faded.
The court’s decision emphasizes the importance of prompt prosecution in criminal cases, and underscores the fact that the prosecution has a responsibility to move cases forward expeditiously. The decision also highlights the role that defense counsel can play in identifying potential due process violations, and underscores the importance of defense counsel’s vigilance in protecting their clients’ rights.