People v Duval
2021 NY Slip Op 00896 [36 NY3d 384]
Decided on February 11, 2021
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Issue:
The Particularity Clause and Search Warrants
Whether a search warrant for a “private residence clearly marked” failed to meet the constitutional requirement for particularity and those of CPL 690.15 with regard to the “place to be searched” because it failed to identify any individual unit within the house, which the defendant alleged was a multiunit dwelling.
Holding:
Search Warrant Not Overly Broad
The Court held that the search warrant was properly issued and executed upon finding of probable cause and comported with the constitutional particularity requirements and the requirements under CPL 690.15 [1][a]. Additionally, in his suppression motion, the defendant failed to provide evidence that the dwelling was divided into separate units. The Court concluded that the warrant was not overly broad in its description of a “private residence clearly marked.”
Facts:
Police obtained a search warrant for Drury Duval’s residence and recovered a handgun and ammunition. The warrant authorized a search for the purchase or sale of firearms, ammunition, and related evidence at a specified street address for a “private residence clearly marked.” Duval pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal possession of a weapon and was sentenced to 2 to 4 years’ imprisonment.
Duval moved to controvert the search warrant and suppress evidence seized, arguing that the warrant failed to meet constitutional requirements of particularity because it failed to identify any individual unit within the house. Duval alleged that the house was a multiunit dwelling, and offered three documents to support his assertion: a deed showing the property was owned by Duval’s mother, a record from the New York City Housing Preservation and Development website showing that the house had been registered with HPD as having three “A” units, and an affidavit from Duval’s mother stating that Duval lived on the third floor of the house. The motion court denied suppression of the evidence, and the Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, holding that the warrant was sufficiently particularized on its face, and that the building “in fact did not consist of multiple discrete units.”
Analysis:
Search Warrants: Constitutional Requirements and the Particularity Clause
The Court held that the warrant satisfied the constitutional requirement that the warrant “particularly describe the place to be searched” (US Const Amend IV; CPL 690.15 [1][a]; 690.45 [5]). The warrant’s description of “a private residence” at the specified address was not facially deficient, as the building had “one street address, one front door, and one side door.”
Search Warrants: Particularity In Applications, Overbreadth of Facts, Voidability
In People v Rainey (14 NY2d 35 [1964]) the Court held that a search warrant was “void at its inception” where a search of said “entire premises” failed to particularize that the property consisted of two separate residential apartments and “that fact was known to the police officer, but not brought to the attention of the court at the time he obtained the warrant” (id. at 36, 37). In Rainey, the Court held that the warrant was void because police “should have known, from reasonable investigation that the warrant description was overbroad” (see Maryland v Garrison, 480 US 79, 85 [1987]). In this case, the level of particularity in the warrant’s description of the place to be searched matched the facts available to the detective and presented to the warrant court.
Search Warrants: What You’ll Need For Suppression of Evidence
To establish his entitlement to a suppression hearing, Duval was required to raise a question of fact as to whether, based on what the detective knew or should have known about the premises, the warrant’s description of the premises as a single residence was accurate. The motion court denied Duval’s suppression motion because the defendant did not provide adequate “sworn allegations of fact” (CPL 710.60 [1]; see also People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415,421 [1993]).
Duval could have submitted affidavits as to the separateness of the alleged residences on the three floors, the existence of unrelated tenants on the second floor, the obviousness to a visitor that the building contained separate residences (such as allegations that each unit had separate locking entry doors), but Duval instead submitted a deed showing that his mother owned the property, an affidavit from his mother stating that at the time of the search, Duval lived on the third floor, and a record from the NYC Department of Housing Preservation and Development website showing that the house had been registered with HPD as having three “A” units. These records failed to proffer evidence that the building’s outward appearance indicated that it was not a single-family residence. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the building “in fact did not consist of multiple discrete units.”
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